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ARTICLE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE
PLANNING: LEADING CASES UNDER
THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ACT
JAMES G. MOOSE 

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen years or so, the relationship between land use
planning and water supply development has received considerable
attention in the California Legislature and in California Supreme Court
and court of appeal decisions interpreting the California Environmental
Quality Act (“CEQA”). 1 The relevant legislation and case law direct
cities and counties, when acting as CEQA lead agencies for substantial
land use projects, to work with water suppliers to assess the availability
of water for such projects in light of other anticipated demands. As
California struggles to contend with both its growing human population
and its increasing environmental challenges, local agencies must be
careful not to approve new development at levels that cannot be
*
Jim Moose is the senior partner in Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley, LLP, where he has
practiced for nearly 25 years, with a focus on advising public and private clients with respect to
issues arising under the California Environmental Act (CEQA), Planning and Zoning Law, and
various other state and federal environmental laws. Along with his partner Whitman F. Manley and
former partner Tina A. Thomas, he is co-author of Guide to the California Environmental Quality
Act, a respected legal treatise frequently cited by the appellate courts. Over the last two decades, he
has also participated in drafting amendments to CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines.
1
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, § 21000 et seq. (Westlaw 2010).
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adequately served with dependable long-term water supplies.
In 1995, in legislation commonly known as “SB 901,” the
Legislature created a process whereby cities and counties approving
certain types of large development projects were required to seek “water
supply assessments” (WSA) from the “public water systems” responsible
for serving such projects with water. These assessments were intended to
inform the preparation of the environmental documents for the
development projects. 2 In 2001, in legislation commonly known as “SB
610,” the Legislature closed some of the perceived loopholes in the
original WSA mechanism and altered some of the procedures created by
SB 901. 3 At the same time, the Legislature, through parallel legislation
known as “SB 221,” created what has been called a “fail-safe” procedure
mandating that, before a city or county can approve a final subdivision
map for a residential project that will include more than 500 dwelling
units, the city or county must first receive from the applicable water
supplier a written verification of the availability of a water supply for the
project. 4
Even before the Legislature created water supply assessment and
verification requirements, 5 the courts began to grapple with how land use
and water supply planning should be coordinated through the
adjudication of CEQA cases related to substantial development projects.
These cases have created a body of law that complements, but is
independent of, the requirements of SB 610 and SB 221.
The most significant judicial event on the subject of CEQA and
water supply in recent years was the California Supreme Court’s
issuance in early 2007 of its decision in Vineyard Area Citizens for
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova. 6 In its first opinion
since 1988 addressing the adequacy of an environmental impact report

2

1995 Cal. Stat. 6701.
See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10915 (Westlaw 2010); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151.9;
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15155 (2010).
4
Although “subdivision,” for purposes of this requirement, generally means a subdivision
creating more than 500 dwelling units, in situations in which a water supplier (“public water
system”) is a relatively small entity, the requirement applies to “any residential development that
would account for an increase of 10 percent or more in the number of the public water system’s
existing service connections.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010). Furthermore, infill and low-income housing projects are excluded from the requirement, regardless of the number of
units involved. Id. § 66473.7(i).
5
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21159.1; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10915; CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 66473.7.
6
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal.
4th 412 (2007).
3
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(EIR), the high court set forth a set of principles, derived from over a
decade of court of appeal case law, governing the manner in which cities
and counties must address water-related issues in land use EIRs.
This Article will survey and analyze this 2007 California Supreme
Court decision and the key appellate court cases leading up to and
following it, all of which address the relationship between land use
planning and water supply planning under CEQA. The Article will also
address a subsequent California Supreme Court decision addressing the
adequacy of the EIR for one of the most significant water supply
programs in recent decades, the so-called CALFED Record of Decision,
which reflected, as of the year 2000, a long-term strategy for addressing
ecological problems occurring in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta while increasing the reliability of southbound water exports from
that water body. 7 Lessons from the case law as it currently exists may be
broadly described as follows:
1) According to CEQA case law (as opposed to SB 610 and SB 221),
EIRs for substantial development projects should analyze the
availability of existing or realistically available water supplies for
proposed development, and cannot get by simply by identifying
theoretical water rights or contract rights that may be very difficult to
translate into actual water for human use within any foreseeable time
frame. “CEQA’s informational purposes are not satisfied by an EIR
that simply ignores or assumes a solution to the problem of supplying
water to a proposed land use project. Decision makers must, under the
law, be presented with sufficient facts to ‘evaluate the pros and cons
8
of supplying the amount of water that the [project] will need.’” The
focus of the analysis should be on whether particular supplies “bear a
likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and
unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for
decisionmaking under CEQA.” 9
2) “If the uncertainties inherent in long-term land use and water
planning make it impossible to confidently identify the future water
sources, an EIR may satisfy CEQA if it acknowledges the degree of
uncertainty involved, discusses the reasonably foreseeable

7

In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th
1143 (2008).
8
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 431 (quoting Santiago
County Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818, 829 (Ct. App. 1981)).
9
Id. at 432 (quoting Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles
(SCOPE I), 106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 720-23 (Ct. App. 2003)).
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alternatives—including alternative water sources and the option of
curtailing the development if sufficient water is not available for later
phases—and discloses the significant foreseeable environmental
effects of each alternative, as well as mitigation measures to minimize
each adverse impact.” 10
3) EIRs for substantial development projects should also analyze or
disclose the physical impacts associated with obtaining new water
supplies for development projects. 11
4) Finally, EIRs for land use plans should formulate mitigation
measures that prevent physical development from occurring before
water supplies are physically available for delivery, though land use
plans may be approved without all of the water necessary for build-out
being immediately available. However, “[t]he law’s informational
demands may not be met, in this context, simply by providing that
future development will not proceed if the anticipated water supply
fails to materialize. But when an EIR makes a sincere and reasoned
attempt to analyze the water sources the project is likely to use, but
acknowledges the remaining uncertainty, a measure for curtailing
development if the intended sources fail to materialize may play a role
12
in the impact analysis.”

II.

LEADING CEQA CASES INVOLVING WATER SUPPLY AND LAND
USE PLANNING

The first notable appellate court decision to address the interplay
between CEQA and water supply issues was Santiago County Water
District v. County of Orange, decided in 1981, involving a proposed
sand-and-gravel mining project. 13 There, the court considered a projectlevel EIR that contained limited analysis of the project’s water supply
needs and impacts. 14 Fifteen years later, the court of appeal decision in
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus dealt with
water supply issues in a broader land use planning context. 15 Five years
after that decision, another appellate court in Napa Citizens for Honest
10

Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 434.
Id. at 431 (citing Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App.
4th 182, 206 (Ct. App. 1996)).
12
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 432.
13
Santiago County Water Dist., 118 Cal. App. 3d 818.
14
Id.
15
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182.
11
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Government v. Napa County Board of Supervisors added nuances to the
discussion in Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project. 16
In addition to grappling with the timing of water supply and land
use planning, courts have also been forced to address the uncertainties
inherent in California water law, drought supplies, and delivery
infrastructure, as well as the impacts of these and other uncertainties on
effective water supply planning and environmental review. 17 For
instance, the decisions in Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the
Environment v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I) and California Oak
Foundation v. City of Santa Clarita involved water suppliers’ reliance on
uncertain State Water Project (“SWP”) “entitlements,” and, more
specifically, a single water transfer for the annual contract rights to up to
41,000 acre-feet of water from the SWP, some portion of which was
“paper water.” 18 These cases teach that, at least in some instances, EIRs
for development projects partly dependent on SWP supplies must
disclose the fact that SWP “entitlements” are not the same as actual
supplies. 19
In early 2007, the California Supreme Court finally weighed in on
all of these points, issuing the landmark opinion in Vineyard Area
Citizens for Responsible Growth. 20 In its decision, the court reviewed
and considered the prior court of appeal case law and drew together the
different strands into a single set of principles governing the preparation
of water supply analyses in land use EIRs. 21 In late 2007, the court of
appeal decision in Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the
Environment v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), applying standards
announced in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, handed
the first published appellate victory to a respondent agency in the series
of cases involving the above-referenced 41,000-acre-feet water
transfer. 22
16

Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 91 Cal. App. 4th 342
(Ct. App. 2001).
17
See, e.g., Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t. v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I),
106 Cal. App. 4th 715 (Ct. App. 2003); Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th
1219 (Ct. App. 2005).
18
See id.
19
Id.
20
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal.
4th 412 (2007).
21
Id.
22
Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), 157 Cal.
App. 4th 149 (Ct. App. 2007); see also Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water
Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373 (Ct. App. 2002) (setting aside EIR for 41,000 acre feet transfer);
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Finally, in June 2008, the California Supreme Court issued its longawaited decision entitled In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental
Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, in which the court upheld a
program EIR for a thirty-year program for various actions associated
with the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. 23 Although this last
decision addresses an EIR for a water supply/ecosystem restoration
program rather than an EIR for a land use plan, 24 the decision is
nevertheless relevant to the interplay between water supply planning and
land use planning.
Each of these precedent-setting cases is discussed in detail below.
A.

SANTIAGO WATER DISTRICT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE

In Santiago Water District v. County of Orange, 25 a county water
district challenged the approval of an EIR for a proposed sand and gravel
mining operation. 26 The EIR contained no information demonstrating
that any water supplier had agreed to provide water to the project, and no
analysis regarding the environmental effects of any such water delivery
and usage. 27 The respondent county nevertheless found the EIR to be
adequate and approved the project subject to the condition that the
operator subsequently establish an adequate water supply for the
project. 28
The court of appeal found merit in the petitioner’s challenge, stating
that in general, an EIR “‘should be prepared with a sufficient degree of
analysis to provide decision makers with information which enables
them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of
environmental consequences.’” 29 Here, the EIR failed to provide
sufficient information about the delivery of water to the proposed mining
site, and it did not include any description of the facilities that would

SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th 715 (setting aside EIR for land use plan reliant on same transfer); Cal.
Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (setting aside another EIR for land use project reliant on
transfer). But cf. Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th
210 (Ct. App. 2009) (upholding second EIR for proposed transfer, prepared on remand from Friends
of the Santa Clara River, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373).
23
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th
1143 (2008).
24
Id.
25
Santiago Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818 (Ct. App. 1981).
26
Id. at 822.
27
Id. at 830-32.
28
Id. at 828.
29
Id. at 831 (quoting CEQA Guidelines, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15150).
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have to be constructed to deliver water to the project. 30 The court noted
that, because the construction of additional water-delivery facilities was
“undoubtedly one of the significant environmental effects of the project,”
“a description of the necessary construction had to be included if the EIR
was to serve its informational purpose.” 31 Also, while the EIR did state
that a large quantity of water would be consumed by the project, the EIR
did not include any discussion of the environmental impacts of supplying
such a large quantity of water. 32 Nor did the document address the
effects of that delivery on water service elsewhere in the water district’s
jurisdiction. 33 For these reasons, the court concluded that the EIR was
inadequate. 34
B.

STANISLAUS NATURAL HERITAGE PROJECT V. COUNTY OF
STANISLAUS

In Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 35
the court of appeal not only addressed the need for local agencies to
identify future water supply sources before approving large new
development projects, but also announced principles requiring such
agencies to consider the environmental effects of developing new supply
sources. 36 In this respect, the opinion goes beyond the requirements of
SB 610 and SB 221 and creates CEQA obligations that apply to a
universe of projects that includes, but extends further than, the kinds of
projects subject to that legislation. 37
In Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, the court of appeal
invalidated an EIR for a specific plan because the document had not
adequately dealt with the environmental consequences associated with
acquiring a long-term water supply for the proposed development. 38 The
specific plan would allow 5,000 residential units on 29,500 acres to be
built in four phases over twenty-five years. 39 The EIR evaluated the

30

Santiago Water Dist., 118 Cal. App. 3d at 829.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 830-32.
34
Id. at 829.
35
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182 (Ct.
App. 1996).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 187.
39
Id. at 186.
31
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effects related to providing water during the first five years of the fifteenyear first phase, but it did not address impacts that would occur beyond
that initial period. 40 Instead, the document treated the potential long-term
water supply shortfall as a significant and unavoidable impact, but it
identified as “mitigation” a commitment that further construction,
beyond the first increment, could not occur unless adequate water
supplies could be found. 41 The EIR also stated that additional
environmental review would be required in connection with future wateracquisition projects serving such future development. 42
In holding that the EIR was inadequate, the court stated that “the
County’s approval of the project under these circumstances defeated a
fundamental purpose of CEQA: to ‘inform the public and responsible
officials of the environmental consequences of their decisions before
they are made.’” 43 The court rejected the respondent agency’s argument
that, because the EIR was only a “first tier” document, to be augmented
in the future with additional negative declarations or EIRs, the county
was not required to analyze long-term water supply impacts to the degree
advocated by the petitioners. 44 The court explained that:
a decision to “tier” environmental review does not excuse a
governmental entity from complying with CEQA’s mandate to
prepare, or cause to be prepared, an environmental impact report on
any project that may have a significant effect on the environment, with
that report to include a detailed statement setting forth “[a]ll
significant effects on the environment of the proposed project.” 45

Even though the respondent and applicant recognized, in effect, that
large portions of the project might not be built should water supplies not
be forthcoming, the willingness to bear that risk was no substitute for
proper CEQA compliance. 46 The approval of a specific plan embodies a
decision to encourage or permit the full complement of development
contemplated by the plan. 47 The EIR for such a specific plan should
therefore look at water issues assuming full build-out:
40

Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
42
Id.
43
Id. (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 6 Cal. 4th 1112, 1123 (1993)).
44
Id. at 197.
45
Id. (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100).
46
Id. at 199.
47
Id.
41
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No matter what subsequent environmental review might take place,
and no matter what additional mitigation measures might be adopted
to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts on each of the four
“phases” of planned development, the project was going to need water
from some source or sources. To defer any analysis whatsoever of the
impacts of supplying water to this project until after the adoption of
the specific plan calling for the project to be built would appear to be
48
putting the cart before the horse.

The court made the following statements regarding what steps the
respondent would have to take to comply with CEQA:
We are not concluding respondent must first find a source of water
for the “project” before an EIR will be adequate. We are concluding
that an EIR for this project must address the impact of supplying water
for the project. It is not mitigation of a significant environmental
impact on a project to say that if the impact is not addressed then the
project will not be built. The decision not to build may well rest upon
the absence of a suitable or adequate water source. However, the
decision to approve the EIR of this project does require recognition
that water must be supplied, that it will come from a specific source or
one of several possible sources, of what the impact will be if supplied
from a particular source or possible sources and if that impact is
adverse how it will be addressed. While it might be argued that not
building a portion of the project is the ultimate mitigation, it must be
borne in mind that the EIR must address the project and assumes the
49
project will be built.

Notably, like SB 610, 50 the Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project
decision stops short of prohibiting legislative land use approvals in the
absence of a guaranteed water supply sufficient for full buildout.
Furthermore, the decision required that a specific plan EIR address the
environmental impacts associated with developing whatever new water
sources would be needed to serve the planned development. 51
This latter directive, though perhaps arguably always implicit in
CEQA principles, required a departure from prior standard practice, as
witnessed by the author in the decade preceding the decision. Before the
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project decision was issued in 1996, land

48

Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
50
CAL. WATER CODE § 10911 (Westlaw 2010).
51
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 205-06.
49
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use EIRs had very seldom gone beyond merely identifying potential
water sources. In the aftermath of the decision, however, land use EIRs,
at least in some instances, were required to focus on the question of
whether the use of surface water or groundwater in new development
could harm distant fisheries or aquifers. 52
C.

NAPA CITIZENS FOR HONEST GOVERNMENT V. NAPA COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

In Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Board of
Supervisors, 53 petitioners challenged a Final Subsequent EIR (“FSEIR”)
and specific plan prepared by Napa County to facilitate the industrial
development of an unincorporated area south of the City of Napa. 54
Petitioners alleged, among other things, that the FSEIR failed to
adequately analyze and mitigate identified significant impacts regarding
water distribution. 55 The court agreed. 56
The court characterized as follows the manner in which the FSEIR
dealt with water issues:
[T]he FSEIR assumes that water to the Project area will be supplied in
the future, as it is supplied now, by [the City of] American Canyon.
American Canyon receives water from the State Water Project via the
North Bay Aqueduct. The FSEIR reports that at present, American
Canyon uses less than one-half of the amount of water allocated to it,
but it appears that by the year 2015, the combined needs of the city
and the Project will exceed American Canyon’s aqueduct allotment.
The FSEIR further reports that American Canyon is in the process of
reaching an agreement with the City of Vallejo that will permit
American Canyon to purchase additional water from a water treatment
facility in that nearby town. The FSEIR assumes that this water will
prevent the anticipated shortfall. It therefore concludes that the
57
Project’s demand for water will not result in a significant effect.

The court then discussed the applicable legal principles derived
from prior case law:
52

See, e.g., Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182.
Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 91 Cal. App. 4th 342
(Ct. App. 2001).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 354.
56
Id. at 375.
57
Id. at 372.
53
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It has been held that an EIR is inadequate if it fails to identify at
least a potential source for water. In Stanislaus Natural Heritage
Project v. County of Stanislaus, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, for
example, the failure to identify a source of water beyond the first five
years of development rendered the EIR inadequate, although the
developer was pursuing several possible sources. It also has been held
that an EIR is inadequate if the project intends to use water from an
existing source, but it is not shown that the existing source has enough
water to serve the project and the current users. (Santiago County
Water Dist. v. County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818.) On the
other hand, it has been held that an EIR is not required to engage in
speculation in order to analyze a “worst case scenario.” (Towards
Responsibility in Planning v. City Council (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 671
(hereafter TRIP).) In that case, the court held that an EIR was not
required to analyze the effects that would result from the construction
of a sewage treatment facility, when (1) all indications suggested that
the facility would never be needed, and (2) the facility – if it was
58
constructed – would be subjected to its own environmental review.

The court then applied these precedents to the situation before it:
The present situation falls somewhere between that at issue in TRIP
on the one hand, and those in Stanislaus and Santiago, on the other.
In TRIP, affected cities had entered into agreements designed to
provide service sufficient to meet the project’s needs. In the present
case, the necessary agreements have not yet been reached, and as the
Project has no control over those agreements, it cannot ensure that
they will be reached. Unlike the EIR in Santiago, the FSEIR does
consider the impact of the Project’s needs on the area’s resources and
the ability of those resources to meet the demands of other users.
Unlike the situation in Stanislaus, the FSEIR has identified sources for
water and facilities for the treatment of wastewater, although their
availability has not been absolutely established. Moreover, the FSEIR
analyzes the capacities of the existing systems and concludes that the
anticipated resources, if available, will be able to handle the Project
area’s needs for water and disposal of wastewater.
It follows that a compromise between the positions adopted in those
cases is in order. We concluded that the FSEIR need not identify and
analyze all possible resources that might serve the Project should the
anticipated resources fail to materialize. Because of the uncertainty
surrounding the anticipated sources for water and wastewater
58

Id. at 372-73.
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treatment, however, the FSEIR also cannot simply label the possibility
that they will not materialize as “speculative,” and decline to address
it. The County should be informed if other sources exist, and be
informed, in at least general terms, of the environmental consequences
of tapping such resources. Without either such information or a
guarantee that the resources now identified in the FSEIR will be
available, the County simply cannot make a meaningful assessment of
59
the potentially significant environmental impacts of the Project.

After explaining why the FSEIR had a flawed approach in its
treatment of water supply impacts, the court next addressed the kind of
“mitigation” that would have been appropriate under the circumstances:
[A]s we have found that the FSEIR is inadequate in failing either to
identify new sources or to report that none is available, the FSEIR also
is inadequate in failing to identify and analyze appropriate mitigation
measures related to the alternative sources, if any. In theory, at least,
the FSEIR also could state a mitigation measure that would prevent
development if the identified sources fail to materialize. 60

The language italicized immediately above provides important
guidance to local lead agencies faced with a temporary water supply
shortfall at the time of project approval. A mitigation measure
“prevent[ing] development” until “identified sources” of water
“materialize” is a form of “phasing” of development. Well established in
other contexts, 61 such a strategy should ensure that actual physical
development does not occur until such time as there is adequate water to
serve it. Thus, where a city or county has identified a possible water
source for new development, but that source is not yet certain to be
available at the time of discretionary project approval, the city or county
may approve the project subject to a mitigation measure that permits
actual development only as water supplies become certain and reliable. 62
59

Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
61
See, e.g., Mira Dev. Corp. of San Diego v. City of San Diego, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1201,
1215-16 (Ct. App. 1988); Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520, 52932 (Ct. App. 1983).
62
The Napa Citizens court’s enthusiasm for phasing as a legitimate form of mitigation
provides a counterbalance to the seemingly sweeping language in Stanislaus Natural Heritage
Project to the effect that “[i]t is not mitigation of a significant environmental impact on a project to
say that if the impact is not addressed then the project will not be built.” Stanislaus Natural Heritage
Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182, 205 (Ct. App. 1996). Read together, Napa
Citizens and Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project should be understood to treat phasing as a
60
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SANTA CLARITA ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING THE
ENVIRONMENT V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (SCOPE I)

“An environmental impact report for a housing development must
contain a thorough analysis that reasonably informs the reader of the
amount of water available.” 63 With that succinct statement, the court in
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of
Los Angeles (SCOPE I) cemented the CEQA requirement that an EIR for
a substantial development project must address the adequacy of the water
supply for the project. Further elucidated in Vineyard Area Citizens for
Responsible Growth, this requirement is independent of statutory
mandates requiring water suppliers to provide information to land use
planning agencies. 64
The project at issue in SCOPE I was a mixed residential and
commercial development composed of 2,545 dwelling units, 180,000
square feet of commercial retail space, and 46 acres of community
facilities. 65 The Valencia Water Company (“Valencia”), a water retailer
supplied by the Castaic Lake Water Agency (“Castaic”), a water
wholesaler, was to provide water to the project. 66 The EIR estimated that
project would demand 2,194 acre-feet per year (AFY). 67
Castaic’s current supply was reported to be between 97,700 and
106,700 AFY. 68 The sources of Castaic’s supply included groundwater,
recycled water, and 54,200 AFY of “current entitlements” from the
SWP. 69 Because Castaic’s water demand at that time was only 48,858
AFY, the draft EIR concluded that there was sufficient water to meet the
Project’s demand. 70 Valencia was also reported to have sufficient water
legitimate form of mitigation but an inadequate substitute, by itself, for an EIR’s failure to identify
and analyze the likely sources of water for a proposed development project. See also Vineyard Area
Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412, 432 (2007) (“[A]
measure for curtailing development if the intended sources fail to materialize may play a role in the
impact analysis.”); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t. v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I),
106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 723 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a mitigation measure requiring a showing
of adequate water supplies prior to tract map recordation does not obviate the need for an EIR to
fully analyze a project’s impacts on water supply).
63
Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal.
App. 4th 715, 717 (Ct. App. 2003).
64
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 428, 432.
65
SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 718.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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to supply the Project. 71
In the discussion of cumulative impacts, however, the Draft EIR
disclosed that buildout in the entire Santa Clarita Valley would result in a
water shortage. 72 The Draft EIR further claimed, though, that Castaic had
the opportunity to purchase additional entitlements under the so-called
“Monterey Agreement” between the California Department of Water
Resources (DWR) and its contractors, and that these additional
entitlements, along with water banking and other storage, would provide
enough water for growth in the valley. 73 The Draft EIR also determined
that there would be no significant and unavoidable cumulative impacts
because each project would be required to demonstrate water availability
prior to construction. 74
Plaintiffs challenged the EIR’s adequacy, claiming that the EIR did
not “state accurately the amount of water available.” 75 As explained
below, the court of appeal agreed.
The court began its analysis by referring to passages in an earlier
appellate decision, entitled Planning & Conservation League v.
Department of Water Resources, 76 explaining the difference between
SWP paper “entitlements” and the amount of real water the SWP can
actually deliver. 77 In relevant part, the SCOPE I court noted that, because
the SWP has never been completed, “there is a huge gap between what is
promised [to holders of entitlements] and what can be delivered.” 78
71

Id. at 719.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 719.
75
Id. at 720.
76
Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 (Ct.
App. 2000).
77
SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 720-21.
78
Id. at 721 (quoting Planning & Conservation League, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 908). Planning
& Conservation League involved the efforts of DWR and several of its large customers (water
contractors) to modify the operations of the massive (but only partially completed) SWP. These
agencies’ goals included making the SWP more efficient, and thus more dependable as a source of
long-term water supplies for its vast service area, by eliminating standard contract provisions
requiring agricultural contractors to forgo water deliveries during drought conditions before urban
contractors were required to do so, and facilitating water transfers from agricultural to urban
contractors. The proposed SWP operational modifications were embodied in the “Monterey
Agreement.”
Because the proposed Monterey Agreement was a project subject to CEQA, an EIR was
necessary. Interestingly, the court of appeal, in finding the EIR inadequate, focused not on the
impacts of the Monterey Agreement itself, but on impacts that might occur if it were not
implemented. Specifically, the No Project Alternative was inadequate for failing to spell out the
potential negative environmental consequences that might occur if DWR carried out the pre-existing
72
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The court then explained that the purpose of an EIR “is to inform
the public and its responsible officials of the environmental
consequences of decisions before they are made.” 79 “To be adequate, the
EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those who did not participate
in its preparation to understand and ‘meaningfully’ consider the issues
raised by the proposed project.” 80
The EIR in this case relied heavily on SWP entitlements to
demonstrate the sufficiency of water supplies for the project. 81 The EIR
made no attempt, however, “to calculate or even discuss the differences
between entitlement and actual supply.” 82 Further, the EIR did not
provide any evidence to support the assertion that the SWP could supply
100 percent of entitlements in wet years, and 50 percent in extreme
drought years. 83
The real party in interest in this case attempted to show that there
was sufficient information regarding the availability of SWP entitlements
by pointing to various documents in the record, including a report in an
appendix and information submitted by project opponents, but without
arrangements for allocating water shortages. These arrangements, the court explained, would carry
forward the fiction that actual water molecules were available to support the full SWP “entitlements”
mentioned in various water supply agreements between DWR and its contractors:
Paper water always was an illusion. “Entitlements” is a misnomer, for contractors surely
cannot be entitled to water nature refuses to provide or the body politic refuses to harvest,
store, and deliver. Paper water represents the unfulfilled dreams of those who, steeped in the
water culture of the 1960’s, created the expectation that 4.23 maf of water could be delivered
by a SWP built to capacity. . . . DWR and the contractors have forsaken their expectation that
the SWP facilities will be built as planned and will deliver 4.23 maf of water annually. . . .
Indeed, fiscal and environmental pressures militate against completion of the project.
....
. . . [L]and use decisions are appropriately predicated in some large part on assumptions
about the available water supply. There is certainly the possibility that local decision makers
are seduced by contractual entitlements and approve projects dependent on water worth little
more than a wish and a prayer.
Planning & Conservation League, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 914-15 & n.7 (emphasis added).
In making the pronouncements quoted above, the court of appeal, in effect, warned land use
planners across California – particularly in areas, such as much of Southern California, currently
served by the SWP – that they must not be “seduced” by SWP “paper water” that may never become
available. Thus, although the holding of the Planning & Conservation League decision will not
affect day-to-day land use planning, the Planning & Conservation League decision nevertheless
demands local agencies’ attention. These agencies ought not plan for new development based on
paper water supplies that may never materialize.
79
SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 721.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 722.
83
Id.
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serious response. 84 The court reasoned, however, that “[i]t is not enough
for the EIR simply to contain information submitted by the public and
experts. Problems raised by the public and responsible experts require a
good faith reasoned analysis in response.” 85 The EIR in this case did not
contain such good-faith reasoning. According to the court, “[w]ater is too
important to receive such cursory treatment.” 86
The court also briefly explained that the fact that a project may not
record a tract map until an adequate supply of water is demonstrated did
not excuse the inadequacies in the EIR itself. 87 Again, the court noted
that “[a]n EIR’s purpose is to inform,” and emphasized that this purpose
“is not satisfied by simply stating information will be provided in the
future.” 88 Even if supplies will be obtained in the future, the EIR must
contain adequate information about supplies currently available, as well
as disclose the likelihood of the actual availability of future supplies.
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the court’s analysis
focused on the fact that SWP entitlements played a significant role in the
EIR’s consideration of water supply for the project. A quirk of history
and California water supply planning resulted in a situation where many
water suppliers hold “paper water.” 89 The opinion concluded with the
observation that:
[T]he EIR fails to undertake an adequate analysis of how much water
the SWP can actually deliver in wet, average and dry years. Without
such information, the general public and its responsible officials
cannot make an informed decision on whether to approve the project.
The County’s approval of the West Creek EIR is not supported by
substantial evidence. 90

The court’s holding in SCOPE I could, therefore, be read narrowly
to require only that, for projects dependent on SWP supplies, EIR
preparers must fully disclose the fact that paper SWP “entitlements” are
not the same as actual water supplies and must provide specific evidence
regarding the availability of real SWP water. A somewhat broader
interpretation can be drawn, however, from the court’s statement, at the

84

Id.
Id. at 723.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 721.
90
Id. at 724.
85
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very beginning of the opinion, that “[a]n environmental impact report for
a housing development must contain a thorough analysis that reasonably
informs the reader of the amount of water available.” 91 Even this
statement, however, could be narrowly construed to suggest that such
analysis is necessary only for projects that both (i) propose housing and
(ii) require an EIR. 92
While the facts in SCOPE I involve the unique nature of SWP
entitlements, the court’s reasoning could be understood to apply by
analogy to other situations in which vagaries of climate, infrastructure
limitations, or quirks of California water law make water supplies
unreliable or questionable. Language within the opinion supports a
broader interpretation, as do the policies underlying CEQA and, more
importantly, the later pronouncements of the California Supreme Court
in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth.
The statement quoted above, for example, that an EIR must contain
a “thorough analysis that reasonably informs the reader of the amount of
water available” did not specifically limit such analysis to the amount of
water available from SWP entitlements. 93 Indeed, the court stressed that
“[t]o be adequate, the EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those
who did not participate in its preparation to understand and
‘meaningfully’ consider the issues raised by the proposed project.” 94
Notably, SWP entitlements are not the only area of California water law
that involves a degree of uncertainty.
Riparian and overlying rights, for example, have been described as
major sources of uncertainty in California law. 95 As explained by the
California Supreme Court:
[a] riparian owner has no right to any mathematical or specific amount
of the water of a stream as against other like owners. He has only a
right in common with the owners to take a proportional share from the
stream — a correlative right which he shares reciprocally with the
other riparian owners. No mathematical rule has been formulated to
determine such a right, for what is a reasonable amount varies not only
with the circumstances of each case but also varies from year to year

91

Id. at 717.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 721.
95
In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 354-55 (1979).
92
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and season to season. 96

Rights to groundwater are also correlative and are thus subject to
similar limitations. 97 According to the logic of the court’s decision in
SCOPE I, an EIR that relies on such uncertain sources must explain the
uncertainty and provide substantial evidence for any assumptions
regarding supply availability. 98 This broader interpretation is consistent
with CEQA policies requiring that an EIR include sufficient detail to
permit informed decisionmaking. 99 More importantly, though, this
broader interpretation accords with the principles set forth in Vineyard
Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, which are discussed in detail
below, after consideration of the one other intervening CEQA water
supply case.
E.

CALIFORNIA OAK FOUNDATION V. CITY OF SANTA CLARITA

The next installment of the Castaic Lake Water Agency’s water
saga was reported in California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa
Clarita. 100 In that case, the court found that the EIR for the proposed
project was inadequate because the document failed to disclose that the
project’s prospective water supply was uncertain, failed to describe the
nature and extent of the uncertainty, and—perhaps most importantly—
failed to realistically analyze the availability of water to serve the project
given these uncertainties. 101
Before reaching the merits, the court summarized a series of
published decisions from the courts of appeal that it considered highly
relevant to water supply issues in this case. First, in Planning &
Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources, 102 the court
96

Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 559-60 (1944).
Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (Ct.
App. 1975).
98
SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 721-24; see also Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey
County Bd. of Supervisors, 87 Cal. App. 4th 99, 131-34, 143 (Ct. App. 2001) (remanding EIR for
housing project for, among other things, further discussion of alleged “subterranean riparian water
rights” claimed by applicant).
99
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061 (Westlaw 2009) (“The purpose of an [EIR] is to
provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect which a
proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of
such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.”).
100
Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (Ct. App. 2005).
101
Id. at 1244.
102
Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct. App.
2000).
97
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struck down the EIR for the Monterey Agreement, which revised
allocations of water from the SWP between agricultural and urban
contractors and allowed for voluntary transfers of water
“entitlements.” 103 The court made several comments, essentially in dicta,
that have been frequently cited by other courts and thus have proven to
be key concerns for water purveyors using SWP water. The court said
that SWP “entitlements” were established on the assumption that the
entire SWP would be constructed to enable delivery of about 4.2 million
acre-feet of water per year. 104 In fact, though, the SWP was never
completed, is not expected to be completed, and can only deliver about
half of that amount. 105 As such, SWP “entitlements” are essentially half
water and half “paper.” 106
Second, in Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water
Agency (Friends of the Santa Clara River I), 107 Castaic Lake Water
Agency (“Castaic”) certified an EIR and entered into an agreement to
purchase 41,000 acre-feet per year (AFY) from the Kern County Water
Agency pursuant to the Monterey Agreement. 108 Ultimately, the court
struck down the EIR because it “tiered” off the Monterey Agreement
EIR that had been invalidated by the court in Planning & Conservation
League. 109 The court allowed Castaic to use the water from Kern
County—apparently on Castaic’s declaration that the 41,000 AFY was
absolutely needed to serve existing water supply demands—but left
open, until Castaic properly complied with CEQA, the question whether
such supplies might be relied on to approve new development. 110
Third, in SCOPE I, 111 the court held the EIR for a mixed-use project
in the Santa Clarita Valley was inadequate because the water supply
analysis relied on “paper water” from the SWP, a fiction criticized by the
Planning & Conservation League court. 112 In SCOPE I, the EIR failed to
undertake an adequate analysis of the amount of water the SWP could
103

Id. at 897-98.
Id. at 908 n.5.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373
(Ct. App. 2002).
108
Id. at 1375.
109
Id. at 1375-76.
110
Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1238 nn.15 & 16 (Ct.
App. 2005).
111
Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal.
App. 4th 715 (Ct. App. 2003).
112
Id. at 721.
104
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actually deliver in wet, average, and dry years. 113
Fourth, in Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water
Agency (Friends of the Santa Clara River II), 114 the court held that the
urban water management plan (“UWMP”) prepared by Castaic did not
comply with the statutory requirements for such a plan because the
document did not adequately describe the reliability of groundwater
supplies in light of perchlorate contamination located in groundwater. 115
While the UWMP mentioned that a groundwater cleanup plan was being
developed, the document did not discuss whether the plan had been
completed, or the date when the plan would be completed and
implemented. 116 Moreover, the UWMP did not state how fast the
perchlorate contamination was spreading, or how any uncertainty on
timing issues would affect the reliability of the supply of groundwater. 117
These cases form the legal backdrop of the court’s decision in
California Oak Foundation. In that case, the respondent city certified an
EIR for a 161-acre industrial park. 118 The industrial park would be
constructed on previously undeveloped property and would require about
386 AFY of water. 119 The EIR identified Newhall County Water District
as the agency that would serve the project with water. 120 Newhall,
however, is only a water retailer; it gets its water from the Castaic, which
in turn gets its water from the SWP and from groundwater. 121 Castaic
claims entitlements to about 95,200 AFY of water from the SWP;
additionally, it claims groundwater supplies of between 8,000 AFY and
85,700 AFY. 122 Castaic estimated that over the next twenty years, water
demand in the area would be about 75,100 AFY. 123 Assuming that
groundwater was available only at the lower figure, 8,000 AFY, Castaic
estimated that it would have a water supply surplus of about 28,100 AFY
in the twenty-year planning horizon. 124 According to the draft EIR, the
project’s demand of roughly 386 AFY would easily be accommodated
113

Id. at 724.
Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Ct.
App. 2004).
115
Id. at 14.
116
Id. at 12-13.
117
Id. at 13.
118
Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1225 (Ct. App. 2005).
119
Id. at 1224, 1231.
120
Id. at 1232.
121
Id. at 1227.
122
Id. at 1229, 1230-31 n.11.
123
Id. at 1230-31.
124
Id.
114
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within Castaic’s “surplus” supply. 125
Petitioners argued that the EIR was inadequate because it did not
fairly describe the actual water supply available to serve the project.
Specifically, petitioners argued that the EIR was defective because (1) it
failed to acknowledge that 41,000 AFY of Castaic’s SWP “entitlements”
were entangled in litigation and might not be available in the future, (2) it
failed to acknowledge that half of Castaic’s entire 95,200 AFY SWP
“entitlements” was merely “paper water” rather than actual water likely
to be available for delivery to serve the project, and (3) it failed to
acknowledge the extent to which groundwater supplies would be
unavailable due to perchlorate contamination. 126 The court agreed with
the first two contentions. 127
One of the prevailing themes in the opinion is that water supply
vulnerabilities must be fully disclosed in an EIR, and the effect of that
vulnerability on supply reliability must be evaluated. The court explained
that one of the primary purposes of an EIR “is to reveal to the public ‘the
basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject
environmentally significant action,’ so that the public, ‘being duly
informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees.’”128
“[T]o be adequate, the EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those
who did not participate in its preparation to understand and
‘meaningfully’ consider the issues raised by the project.” 129 “This
standard is not met in the absence of a forthright discussion of a
significant factor that could affect water supplies.” 130 “[T]he EIR is
intended to serve as an informative document to make government action
transparent. Transparency is impossible without a clear and complete
explanation of the circumstances surrounding the reliability of the water
supply.” 131
The court first addressed the reliability of the 41,000 AFY of SWP
entitlements, which Castaic acquired, indirectly, from the Kern County
Water Agency. 132 Petitioners argued that the EIR was inadequate

125

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1236, 1241-42.
127
Id. at 1244.
128
Id. at 1237 (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 392 (1988)).
129
Id. at 1237 (quoting Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los
Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2003).).
130
Id. at 1237.
131
Id. at 1237-38.
132
Id. at 1236.
126
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because the EIR, without analysis or discussion, relied on Castaic’s
41,000 AFY entitlement to SWP water despite the fact that the EIR for
Castaic’s purchase of the entitlement was decertified 133 in Friends of the
Santa Clara River I 134 . The court agreed: “the EIR does not ‘directly
address’ the issue, which arose when [Friends of the Santa Clara River I]
was decided in January 2002, contemporaneously with circulation of the
draft EIR. The final EIR contains an inadequate discussion—in fact, no
discussion at all—of the uncertainty surrounding the transfer of the
41,000 AFY entitlement. The text of the EIR does not mention the
decertification of the EIR for the Castaic purchase . . . .” 135
The court went on to note that an appendix buried at the end of the
final EIR did to some degree address these issues, but the court held this
discussion was inadequate. 136 Acknowledging in an appendix to the
final EIR that the 41,000 AFY was in doubt, and that, absent this water,
supplies might not be sufficient, was “too little and too late . . . . We are
troubled by the fact that the only discussion in the EIR of the uncertainty
created by the decertification of the EIR for the Castaic purchase appears
in an appendix added to the final EIR shortly before certification. The
seriousness of water supply issues . . . merits discussion in the text of the
EIR, where it is most readily accessible.” 137 At a minimum, the court
held, the information should have been contained in an appendix that was
actually referenced in the text of the EIR. 138 The court further chided the
City for failing to explain the possible limitations on the water
entitlements because of ongoing legal challenges: “Without a discussion
of the nature of the limitations, . . . it is impossible to know the contours
of the potential limitation on the water supplies.” 139 In other words, the
City had to go beyond simply acknowledging the deficiency; the City
had to take the additional step of discussing the likelihood of the deficit
and alternative sources of water supply to meet the deficit. 140
Moreover, while the final EIR appendix acknowledged uncertainty
as to whether the 41,000 AFY purchased from Kern would be available,
the final EIR concluded supplies would nevertheless be adequate for the
133

Id.
Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373,
1388 (Ct. App. 2002).
135
Cal. Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1236.
136
Id. at 1239.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1238.
140
Id. at 1239.
134

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol4/iss1/4

22

Moose: Water Supply and Land Use Planning
03_MOOSE PRINTER VERSION (FINAL)

2010]

10/11/2010 10:05:42 AM

WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE PLANNING

49

project because Castaic held entitlements for 56,800 AFY of SWP water,
independent of the water it obtained from the Kern County Water
Agency. 141 The court was troubled that the draft EIR gave “no hint” that
SWP entitlements cannot be taken at face value. 142 While the final EIR
acknowledged elsewhere that the SWP entitlements would be available
at a 50% level 80% of the time and at a 37% level about 20% of the time,
the EIR failed to discuss the import of these admissions. 143 Moreover,
the EIR appendix made misleading comments that contradicted these
admissions. 144 As noted above, the final EIR appendix reasoned that the
56,000 AFY of SWP entitlements exceeded by 18,844 AFY Castaic’s
existing demand for 35,356 AFY of water. 145 These figures assumed that
the full entitlement would be delivered. In fact, employing the agency’s
own estimates, Castaic could expect only about 28,000 AFY of its entire
56,000 AFY entitlement to be delivered the majority of the time. 146 Thus,
absent the 41,000 AFY from the Kern County Water Agency, Castaic
would already be seriously short of water to meet even its existing
demand. 147
The court concluded that the final EIR contained no substantial
evidence or analysis indicating that there was adequate water to serve the
project “in light of the uncertainty flowing from the decertification of the
EIR for the Castaic purchase.” 148 The absence of this information
undermined the information functions of the EIR for the project and
required decertification of the EIR: “[W]ithout the 41,000 AFY
entitlement, substantial evidence of sufficient water supplies simply does
not exist.” 149
The court upheld, however, the EIR’s discussion of perchlorate
contamination of groundwater. 150 The draft EIR had not mentioned
perchlorate contamination; however, it did rely on and incorporate by
reference Castaic’s UWMP, which noted that the discovery of such
contamination could affect groundwater supply availability. 151 The court

141

Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1238.
143
Id. at 1239.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1239.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1240.
149
Id. at 1242.
150
Id.
151
Id.
142
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concluded that the City had discretion to rely on the information in the
UWMP, in large part because the court’s ruling in Friends of the Santa
Clara River II, 152 which found the plan deficient under the Water Code,
came after the EIR was certified. 153 The court described the City’s
victory on this issue as Pyrrhic, however, because the court’s ruling on
the 41,000 AFY transfer from the Kern County Water Agency had “the
practical effect of requiring the City to come to grips with the perchlorate
issue as well, because reliance on groundwater supplies will acquire
additional significance if less imported water is available” from the
SWP. 154
F.

VINEYARD AREA CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH, INC. V.
CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA

In a landmark decision addressing the intersection of CEQA and
water supply analysis for major development projects, the California
Supreme Court pulled together the threads of court of appeal case law
discussed above. 155 In doing so, the high court created a very significant
precedent that now represents the single most significant EIR case for
CEQA practitioners to study carefully.
Factually, the Supreme Court held that the EIR for the “Sunrise
Douglas Community Plan” and the “SunRidge Specific Plan” in what
was now the City of Rancho Cordova contained an adequate analysis of
near-term water supplies. 156 The court also held, however, that the EIR
did not provide an adequate analysis of long-term supplies needed to
serve the community plan, together with other anticipated development
in the area. 157 The court also held the agency should have recirculated the
Draft EIR to disclose impacts from groundwater pumping on listed
species. 158 A detailed discussion of the facts of Vineyard will help to
understand the legal principles announced in the opinion.
A coalition of landowners proposed to develop 6,000 acres in
southeastern Sacramento County, in an area subsequently annexed to the

152

See generally Friends of the Santa Clarita River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 123 Cal.
App. 4th 1, (Ct. App. 2004). Parenthetical explantion is encouraged after see generally
153
Cal. Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1243.
154
Id.
155
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal.
4th 412 (2007).
156
Id. at 421.
157
Id. at 444-45.
158
Id. at 448-49.
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City of Rancho Cordova. 159 The Sunrise Douglas Community Plan
proposed 22,000 residential units, as well as office, industrial and public
uses. 160 The coalition also proposed the SunRidge Specific Plan – a
subset encompassing 2,600 acres and 9,886 residential units to be
developed as an initial phase of the project. 161 The County prepared an
EIR analyzing the impacts of implementing both plans. 162 The County
Board of Supervisors certified the EIR and approved the plans. 163 A
coalition of citizens’ groups (the “Citizens”) sued, and the trial court and
court of appeal denied the petitions. 164 The California Supreme Court
granted a petition for review on two issues: (1) the adequacy of the EIR’s
water supply analysis, and (2) impacts of groundwater pumping on the
Cosumnes River. 165
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the County’s water supply
analysis focused on two distinct aspects of the EIR: (1) the analysis of
near-term water supplies needed to serve the Specific Plan, and (2) the
analysis of long-term supplies necessary for the entire Community
Plan. 166
To serve the initial phase of the project, as embodied in the Specific
Plan, the EIR stated that the project would rely on a newly developed
“North Vineyard Well Field” located southwest of the project area. 167
This well field could safely yield up to 10,000 acre-feet annually.168 The
Sacramento County Water Agency would make this water available on a
first-come-first-served basis to the SunRidge and Sunrise Douglas areas,
and to other anticipated development in the area. 169 The record showed
this new well field would initially connect solely to the project area,
whose developers would pay a fee to compensate any nearby well
owners harmed by pumping; and other near-term development would
require only 3,000 AFY, leaving the balance – 7,000 AFY – to meet the
anticipated demand of 5,500 AFY from the SunRidge Specific Plan

159

Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 421.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 436, 438.
167
Id. at 423.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 436.
160
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area. 170 Thus, the court observed, “[w]hile much uncertainty remains, . . .
the record contains substantial evidence demonstrating a reasonable
likelihood that a water source the provider plans to use for the Sunrise
Douglas project . . . will indeed be available at least in substantial part to
supply the Sunrise Douglas project’s near-term needs.” 171 The EIR did
not defer analysis of the impacts of developing these supplies, or rely on
demonstrably illusory supplies. 172 Nor did the EIR need to demonstrate
certainty regarding the project’s future water supplies. 173 To the extent
anticipated water supplies did not materialize, or the agency proposed
new or different supplies, the agency could perform supplemental
analysis to address changes to the project or to the circumstances
surrounding the project. 174
With respect to long-term water supplies intended to serve the
Community Plan as a whole, the court found that the record contained
substantial evidence supporting the County’s conclusion that up to
15,000 AFY in new surface-water diversions from the American River –
so-called “Fazio water” – would be available to serve the project. 175 The
problem, however, was that the Final EIR’s discussion of total long-term
water supply and demand in the broader region “leaves too great a degree
of uncertainty regarding the long-term availability of water for this
project. Factual inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the FEIR leave the
reader―and the decision makers―without substantial evidence for
concluding that sufficient water is, in fact, likely to be available for the
Sunrise Douglas project at full build out.” 176
The EIR’s analysis stated that long-term water demand in “Zone
40” – a large swath of southeastern Sacramento County that included the
Community Plan area – would be approximately 113,000 AFY at buildout of the general plan. 177 Another EIR prepared to analyze the impacts
of increased diversions from the American River – the “Water Forum
EIR” – had estimated Zone 40 demand at 87,000 AFY at build-out. 178
The Sunrise Douglas EIR did not explain the reason for this

170

Id. at 436-37.
Id. at 437.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 438.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 439.
177
Id.
178
Id.
171

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol4/iss1/4

26

Moose: Water Supply and Land Use Planning
03_MOOSE PRINTER VERSION (FINAL)

2010]

10/11/2010 10:05:42 AM

WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE PLANNING

53

discrepancy. 179
On the supply side, the Sunrise Douglas EIR stated that surfacewater deliveries would total roughly 64,000 AFY; elsewhere, the same
EIR estimated new surface-water deliveries at 45,000 AFY. 180 The Water
Forum EIR stated that up to 78,000 AFY in new surface water would
become available. 181 Again, the Sunrise Douglas EIR did not explain
why these numbers differed. 182 In adopting findings approving the
Community Plan, the County used the Final EIR’s estimated demand of
113,000 AFY and estimated surface-water supply of approximately
64,000 AFY, but it did not explain the differing estimates. 183 Although
such an explanation might have existed, it did not appear in the Final
EIR. 184
Nor did the EIR explain how the this gap – 113,000 AFY in Zone
40 demand, versus approximately 64,000 AFY in new surface-water
supplies – would be bridged. 185 When commentators pointed out this
gap, the Final EIR responded that “new surface water supplies are to be
used conjunctively with groundwater supplies.” 186 This explanation,
however, was too “vague and unquantified” to be relied upon, because it
did not explain how groundwater and surface water would be managed
during wet and dry years to bring long-term demand and supply into
balance. 187
The Final EIR stated a full analysis of the conjunctive use program
would be included in the environmental analysis prepared for the Water
Agency’s Zone 40 Master Plan Update, which was pending at the time
the County released the Sunrise Douglas Final EIR. 188 The court rejected
this approach, stating that the County could not avoid its obligation to
analyze the likely water sources for the Sunrise Douglas Community
Plan by referring to a future report; rather, the County either had to
include its analysis in the Sunrise Douglas EIR, or had to await the
completion of the master plan updated analysis, and then tier off it.189

179

Id.
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 439-40.
184
Id. at 440.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 440-41.
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Nor was it apparent how the 10,000 AFY in new groundwater would
bridge the gap between surface-water supplies and anticipated demand,
even using the most optimistic numbers from the Sunrise Douglas and
Water Forum EIRs. 190
The County did not need to demonstrate with certainty that the total
anticipated water supply would be sufficient to meet total demand at
build-out. 191 “But CEQA did require that the FEIR show a likelihood
water would be available, over the long term, for this project. Without an
explanation that shows at least an approximate long-term sufficiency in
total supply, the public and decision makers could have no confidence
that the identified sources were actually likely to fully serve this
extraordinarily large development project.” 192
The real parties in interest pointed to a discussion in the Water
Forum proposal for additional details regarding how the conjunctive use
program would be implemented. 193 The Sunrise Douglas EIR, however,
did not spell out how the EIR related to, incorporated by reference, or
tiered off the Water Forum proposal or accompanying EIR. 194 Thus, the
EIR did not provide an adequate road map to the information or analysis
drawn from other documents. 195 Nor did the EIR expressly incorporate
the impacts and mitigation measures identified in the Water Forum
Proposal’s EIR. 196
The real parties also pointed to the Final EIR’s “mitigation measure
WS-1.” 197 This measure stated that entitlements for development within
the Sunrise Douglas Community Plan would not be granted without
“firm proof of available water supplies” at each phase of development. 198
According to the court, a measure of this sort could serve to supplement
an EIR’s water supply analysis. 199 Under CEQA, however, it could not
substitute for such an analysis. Indeed, in order to rely on such a
measure, the EIR would have to “discuss the probability that the intended
water sources for later phases of development will not eventuate, the
environmental impacts of curtailing the project before completion, and
190

Id. at 441.
Id.
192
Id. (footnote omitted).
193
Id. at 442.
194
Id. at 442-43.
195
Id. at 443.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 444.
198
Id.
199
Id.
191
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mitigation measures planned to minimize any such significant
impacts.” 200 The Sunrise Douglas EIR was inadequate because it did not
include such an analysis. 201
The court provided the following summary of the requirements for
an adequate water supply analysis for a large-scale, long-term
development project:
(1) The EIR must contain information on planned long-term
development in the area and identify the competing water demands
associated with such development. 202
(2) The EIR must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of adequate
long-term supply by showing “a rough balance between water supply
and demand.” 203 If, “despite a full discussion, it is impossible to
confidently determine that anticipated future water sources will be
available, CEQA requires some discussion of possible replacement
sources or alternatives to use of the anticipated water, and of the
environmental consequences of those contingencies.” 204 The estimate
of demand must include not only the proposed project, but also other
planned development in the area. 205
(3) To the extent the EIR relies upon water-supply analyses prepared
for other projects (such as the Water Forum EIR in this case), the EIR
must adhere to the rules governing tiering and incorporation by
reference. Among other things, the EIR for the development project
must incorporate and adopt the mitigation measures identified in the
EIR that is being relied upon. 206
(4) Although an agency may rely on a provision calling for curtailing
the later stages of development if water supplies do not materialize,
the EIR must disclose or propose mitigation for “the environmental
effects of such truncation.” 207

The court then turned to the recirculation issue. The so-called
Revised Recirculated Draft EIR, which the County prepared after the
200

Id.
Id.
202
Id. at 445.
203
Id. at 445-46.
204
Id. at 432
205
Id.
206
Id. at 446.
207
Id. at 447.
201
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first proposed well field ran into regulatory problems and was replaced
by a different proposed well field, stated that the Cosumnes River was
located south of the second proposed well field but did not otherwise
analyze impacts of groundwater extraction on river flows or habitat. 208
Several agencies and other commentators expressed concern that
groundwater extraction would decrease summertime flows in the river
and have an adverse impact on steelhead and Chinook salmon migration
through the area. 209 The Final EIR responded to these comments by
stating that the change in groundwater elevations in the area would be no
more than two feet. 210 The Final EIR concluded that the resulting impact
on river flows would be restricted to low-flow periods, would be limited
to changing the timing and areal extent of the dewatering of the river,
and would not be significant. 211 The County adopted this conclusion in
its findings approving the project. 212
The court held that substantial evidence did not support this finding
because the Final EIR disclosed a potentially significant impact
associated with reduced river flows on aquatic species, including
migrating salmon. 213 The Final EIR’s response conceded groundwater
extraction during low-flow periods could lengthen the period during
which the Cosumnes River was dewatered and thus could hinder fish
migration. 214 Moreover, the migratory reach of the river overlapped with
the area potentially affected by project-related pumping. 215 For this
reason, the response did not constitute substantial evidence that the loss
of stream flows would have no adverse impact on salmon migration, and
the County should have recirculated the analysis in the Final EIR to
address this issue. 216
Justice Baxter concurred with the majority’s opinion that the EIR
contained an adequate analysis of the SunRidge Specific Plan’s nearterm water supply. 217 He dissented, however, from the majority’s opinion
regarding the EIR’s analysis of long-term water supplies. 218 In Justice

208

Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
210
Id. at 425-26.
211
Id. at 426.
212
Id. at 448.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 449.
217
Id. at 450.
218
Id. at 451.
209
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Baxter’s view, the majority erred by requiring the EIR to analyze longterm water supplies not merely for the project, but also for all
conceivable development in the region. 219
G.

SANTA CLARITA ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING THE
ENVIRONMENT V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (SCOPE II)

In Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v.
County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), 220 the court of appeal reviewed the
new EIR prepared on remand from the decision in SCOPE I in light of
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth. 221 Still not satisfied
with the new EIR, the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the
Environment (“SCOPE”) had sued again. The trial court had denied the
petition, and SCOPE had appealed. 222
SCOPE challenged the adequacy of the new EIR’s water supply
analysis as it related to a water-transfer agreement between the Castaic
Lake Water Agency and the Kern County Water Agency (the “KernCastaic transfer”). 223 The new EIR indicated that this transfer would
provide 41,000 acre-feet per year, a significant portion of the supplies
needed for the various projects slated for the Santa Clarita Valley,
including the West Creek project. 224 The court of appeal evaluated this
claim in light of four principles articulated by the California Supreme
Court in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth. The court
distilled those principles as follows:
(1) The EIR must contain sufficient information to allow
decisionmakers to “evaluate the pros and cons of supplying the
amount of water” that the project will need. 225
(2) The EIR for a large land use plan, to be built out over the course of
years, cannot limit its water-supply analysis to initial phases. Although
tiering principles can be used to defer some details to future phases,
the analysis of future phases cannot be entirely avoided at the

219

Id. at 452-53.
Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), 157 Cal.
App. 4th 149 (Ct. App. 2007).
221
See generally id.
222
Id. at 152.
223
Id. at 154.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 158.
220
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outset. 226
(3) “[T]he future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a
likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and
unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient.” The EIR must
include a discussion of the circumstances affecting the likelihood of
the water’s availability. 227
(4) “Where, despite a full discussion, it is impossible to confidently
determine that anticipated future water sources will be available,” the
EIR must identify and analyze the impacts of developing replacement
or alternative sources of water. 228 The agency can include a measure
curtailing development in the event water sources do not
materialize. 229 Such a measure, however, cannot substitute entirely for
analyzing alternative sources. 230

The court held the EIR prepared for the West Creek project adhered
to these principles. 231 First, the EIR did not ignore or assume a solution
to the problem of supplying water to the project. Rather, the EIR
identified specific water sources, including the Kern-Castaic transfer. 232
Second, the EIR did not limit its analysis to the first development phase,
but considered the Kern-Castaic transfer as part of the permanent supply
for the entire project. 233
With respect to the third principle, SCOPE argued that uncertainties
surrounding the Monterey Agreement litigation threatened the reliability
of the Kern-Castaic transfer. 234 That litigation had resulted in
invalidating the EIR for the Monterey Agreement between the
Department of Water Resources and various water districts to allocate
water from the State Water Project. 235 That litigation, in turn, resulted in
invalidating an EIR that tiered off the Monterey Agreement EIR that was
prepared to analyze the impacts of Kern-Castaic water transfer. 236 Since
226

Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct.
App. 2000).
236
Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373,
227
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then, the parties to the Planning & Conservation League litigation had
entered into a settlement agreement. 237 In addition, the Castaic Lake
Water Agency had prepared and certified a new EIR for the Kern-Castaic
transfer, which had provoked another lawsuit. 238
The EIR responded to this uncertain state of affairs by noting that,
even if the litigation resulted in setting aside the Monterey Agreement, a
court was unlikely to require the parties to unwind other agreements
(such as the Kern-Castaic transfer agreement, which had not been set
aside in the aftermath of Friends of the Santa Clara River I). 239 Existing
law and contracts authorized the transfer, even without relying on the
Monterey Agreement. 240 Although the settlement agreement arising out
of the Monterey Agreement litigation did not identify the Kern-Castaic
transfer as a permanent transfer, nothing suggested that the parties to the
Agreement considered the transfer to be temporary. 241 Nor did the record
contain evidence suggesting that the Department of Water Resources
opposed the transfer. 242
SCOPE argued the West Creek EIR improperly tiered off a future
EIR – in this case, the new EIR to be prepared for the Monterey
Agreement after the old one was invalidated in the PCL litigation. 243 The
court disagreed, noting that the West Creek EIR did not tier off future
Monterey Agreement environmental documents; rather, the West Creek
EIR’s water supply analysis was based on the premise that the Monterey
Agreement litigation was unlikely to affect the Kern-Castaic transfer. 244
Thus, the record contained substantial evidence demonstrating a
reasonable likelihood that water from the Kern-Castaic transfer would be
available for the project’s near- and long-term needs. 245
As to the fourth principle, SCOPE argued that West Creek EIR
failed to analyze the project’s water supply in the absence of the Kern-

1388 (Ct. App. 2002).
237
Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210
(Ct. App. 2009).
238
See SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 154; Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake
Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210.
239
SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 160; see Friends of the Santa Clara River, 95 Cal. App.
4th at 1388.
240
SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 160.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 161-62.
244
Id. at 162.
245
Id.
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Castaic transfer. 246 Under Vineyard, the EIR had to acknowledge such
uncertainty, regardless of the reason for it; thus, legal uncertainty had to
be considered. 247 As the court noted, however, “[t]he water is now
available, and for years has been available for the project under executed
agreements. The [West Creek] EIR notes that the Kern-Castaic transfer
can legally occur without the Monterey Agreement. Suffice it to say,
however the Monterey Agreement litigation is eventually decided, the
Kern-Castaic transfer will likely not be affected. Per the fourth principle,
we can confidently determine that the water will be available.” 248
Turning to groundwater, SCOPE argued the West Creek EIR was
deficient because it did not discuss the impact of inadequate funding to
remediate contaminated water wells. 249 The EIR stated some water
would be supplied from two local aquifers tapped by 67 wells. 250 The
record showed that six of these wells were contaminated with
perchlorate, and the estimated cost of remediation was $500,000 per
well. 251 The EIR did not identify a source of funding to carry out the
remediation. 252 The EIR did state, however, that due to the high value of
this water, local water purveyors had placed a high priority on installing
wellhead treatment. 253 Nothing suggested remediation was illusory,
notwithstanding its cost. 254
H.

IN RE BAY-DELTA PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
REPORT COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS

In another major decision dealing with the intersection of water
supply and CEQA, the California Supreme Court upheld the CEQA
analysis for the so-called “CALFED project.” 255 The high court’s

246

Id.
Id.
248
Id. at 162-63. Notably, more than two years after publication of the SCOPE II decision, the
court of appeal for the same appellate district – the Second – upheld the adequacy of the second EIR
prepared by Castaic for the 41,000 AFY transfer, retroactively validating the optimism reflected in
the EIR at issue in SCOPE II. See Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency,
180 Cal. App. 4th 210 (Ct. App. 2009).
249
SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 163.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th
1143 (2008).
247
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opinion in In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report
Coordinated Proceedings addressed consolidated CEQA challenges to
the CALFED Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and
Environmental Impact Report (“PEIS/R”). 256 In summary, the Supreme
Court held that the CALFED PEIS/R was not required to include an
analysis of a possible project alternative that, by reducing existing water
exports from the southern part of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta to agricultural and urban users in the San Joaquin Valley and
Southern California, would not have met one of the project’s primary
objectives of water supply reliability. 257 The court also held that
generalized analyses of the environmental effects of both various
potential additional long-term water supply sources and the
“Environmental Water Account” (“EWA”) were sufficient in light of the
programmatic, first-tier character of the document. 258
The Bay-Delta estuary is created by the convergence of California’s
two largest rivers, the Sacramento and the San Joaquin, which terminate
in the San Francisco Bay. 259 As the court noted, “the Bay-Delta’s
watershed encompasses 37 percent of the state’s surface area, and its
average annual in-flow is 22 million acre-feet of water . . . .” 260 The BayDelta supplies water throughout California via two major water-diversion
projects, the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State Water Project
(“SWP”). 261 The two projects export an average of 5.9 million acre-feet
of water each year, primarily for agricultural and urban uses. 262
The Bay-Delta faces significant water supply and water quality
challenges in addition to broader environmental degradation. 263 More
specifically, the ecology of the estuary has long been in decline; water
exports have grown increasingly unreliable due to these environmental
concerns; the water quality of exports is not optimal; and levees
throughout the Delta could collapse in an earthquake, creating a water
supply crisis for much of California, as export pumps would be
inundated with brackish water. 264
In 1994, the CALFED program was established as a cooperative
256

Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1143, 1152.
258
Id. at 1169.
259
Id. at 1151.
260
Id. at 1152.
261
Id. at 1154.
262
Id. at 1154-55.
263
Id. at 1156.
264
Id.
257
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effort of eight California agencies and ten federal agencies to develop
and implement long-term solutions to the problems facing the BayDelta. 265 The program was divided into three phases. Phase I defined the
problems facing the Bay-Delta and analyzed a wide range of alternatives
for potential solutions. 266 Phase II added further “program elements” to
the previously identified potential alternatives analysis and was the
subject of two draft PEIS/Rs. 267 In the summer of the year 2000, at the
end of Phase II, the lead agency on the project, the California Resources
Agency, certified the final PEIS/R, and the CALFED agencies together
issued a Record of Decision for the program. 268 As envisioned at the
time, Phase III would implement the preferred alternative identified in
the final PEIS/R. 269
Two lawsuits were filed challenging the CALFED PEIS/R for
alleged noncompliance with CEQA and were subsequently consolidated
in Sacramento County Superior Court. 270 The trial court ruled that the
CALFED PEIS/R satisfied the requirements of CEQA; the court
therefore denied the two petitions for a writ of mandate. 271 The Third
District Appellate Court reversed that judgment, however, and instructed
the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate due to what the
appellate court considered to be three violations of CEQA. 272 First,
according to the court of appeal, the PEIS/R improperly failed to include
a full discussion of an alternative to the CALFED Program that would
reduce water exports from the Bay-Delta to CVP and SWP facilities to
the south. 273 Second, the court thought that the PEIS/R lacked an
adequate analysis of the environmental impacts of diverting (and
exporting) additional water from various potential sources. 274 And third,
the PEIS/R, the intermediate court said, did not include sufficient
information detailing impacts associated with the EWA. 275 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the CALFED final PEIS/R for the Bay-
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Id. at 1157.
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Id. at 1159.
268
Id. at 1160.
269
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Id. at 1160-61.
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Delta complied with CEQA as to all three of these issues. 276
One of the primary objectives of the CALFED project was to
improve water supply reliability by reducing the mismatch between
supply and demand for Bay-Delta water (most water in California comes
from streams flowing into the Delta, while most of the water demand
occurs in areas far to the south). 277 Even so, CALFED studied a reduced
exports alternative during Phase I of the project. 278 This reduced export
alternative was not carried over into Phase II, however, and thus was not
included in the formal alternatives analysis portion of the PEIS/R. 279
This omission reflected the CALFED agencies’ conclusion that a
reduced export alternative would not meet the water supply objective of
the project. 280 These agencies instead opted, as part of the strategy for
meeting CALFED’s water supply objective, to include a water-useefficiency program in each of the alternatives that were carried forward
in the PEIS/R. 281
The Supreme Court held that “CALFED properly exercised its
discretion when it declined to carry the reduced export alternative over
for detailed study in the final PEIS/R after concluding that such an
alternative would not achieve the CALFED Program’s fundamental
purpose and thus was not feasible.” 282 In support of its conclusion, the
court relied on the “rule of reason,” which provides that an EIR need
only analyze “those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned
choice.” 283 The rule of reason also allows lead agencies to eliminate from
consideration alternatives that would not “feasibly obtain most of the
basic objectives of the project.” 284 Here, the court determined the
exclusion of the reduced export alternative was consistent with the rule
of reason in light of CALFED’s finding that such an alternative would
not achieve the water supply reliability objective, which the court
considered a “basic goal” of the project. 285
The Supreme Court also determined that, in finding a need for a
reduced export alternative, the court of appeal had erroneously given too
276
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279
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much weight to preexisting adverse environmental conditions in the BayDelta. 286 The Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of the EIR
under CEQA is to analyze the environmental effects of the proposed
project. 287 Regardless of how severe they may be, preexisting
environmental conditions are considered part of the baseline conditions
against which the effects of the project are assessed, and such existing
problems must be distinguished from the new effects that a project may
cause. 288 The court of appeal reasoned that the reduced export alternative
may have been the best alternative to address preexisting environmental
conditions and thus should have been included in the PEIS/R. 289 In
contrast, the Supreme Court found that those preexisting conditions
would continue regardless of the CALFED program and were therefore
part of the baseline under CEQA. 290 Notably, however, the high court
acknowledged that laws other than CEQA (e.g., the state and federal
endangered species acts) might someday lead to diminished exports:
As the CALFED PEIS/R itself recognizes, Bay-Delta ecosystem
restoration to protect endangered species is mandated by both state
and federal endangered species laws, and for this reason water exports
from the Bay-Delta ultimately must be subordinated to environmental
considerations. The CALFED Program is premised on the theory, as
yet unproven, that it is possible to restore the Bay-Delta’s ecological
health while maintaining and perhaps increasing Bay-Delta water
exports through the CVP and SWP. If practical experience
demonstrates that the theory is unsound, Bay-Delta water exports may
need to be capped or reduced. At this relatively early stage of program
design, however, we conclude that CALFED properly applied the rule
of reason when it decided to consider in the PEIS/R only alternatives
that have the potential to both achieve ecosystem restoration goals and
meet current and projected water export demands, and that will
provide balanced progress in all four of the program areas. 291

286

Id. at 1167.
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a).
290
In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1168.
291
Id. at pp. 1168-69 (emphasis added). There is no indication that the Supreme Court shared
the court of appeal’s view that a reduction of exports would necessarily translate, as an empirical
matter, into reduced population growth in California. On that subject, the Third District Court of
Appeal had said the following:
287

In order to meet the water supply reliability objective of the Program, all of the alternatives
proposed in the PEIS/R call for increased exports of water to areas south of the Delta, or at
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The final consideration with regard to the missing reduced export
alternative related to the adverse environmental effects associated with
water-storage facilities and dam construction. 292 On that subject, the
Supreme Court held that “although the PEIS/R did not analyze a reduced
exports alternative, it did analyze no-additional-storage alternatives that
would avoid any adverse environmental consequences of constructing
new dams or enlarging existing ones. Under CEQA, this was
sufficient.” 293 The court also explained that no new water-storage
facilities were included in the CALFED project as of the completion of
Phase II, emphasizing that any proposed facilities would be subject to

least no reduction in the amount of water exported. . . . However, a reasonable alternative to
this approach would be to reduce the amount of water exported south of the Delta, thereby
reducing the amount of water that must be redirected from other users or impounded in new
or existing reservoirs. Although such an alternative would not completely satisfy the
CALFED goal of reducing the mismatch between Bay-Delta water supplies and beneficial
uses, it could satisfy the other Program goals.
The feasibility of such a reduced exports alternative is clear, notwithstanding the projected
population growth that undergirds the commitment not to reduce exports. As stated
previously, it is projected that the state’s population will grow from 30 to 49 million by the
year 2020, and that half of this growth will be in Southern California. Such population
growth requires water. However, if there is no water to support the growth, will it occur as
projected? Population growth is not an immutable fact of life. Stable populations have been
established in such states as New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Inflow
of new residents to California continues to exceed outflow because conditions in the State are
conducive to population growth. One aspect of these conditions is the availability of water.
However, as the State reaches the limit of available water and must seek other sources such
as desalination, water will become more expensive to obtain and California’s appeal will
lessen.
Years ago some argued that people should follow the water, not vice versa. While it is not
the function of this court to advocate one position or the other, this argument nevertheless
points out a glaring defect in the PEIS/R. CALFED conducted its environmental analysis by
assuming certain population growth in the State over the next 15 years and then finding ways
to provide water to that population. But CALFED appears not to have considered, as an
alternative, smaller water exports from the Bay-Delta region which might, in turn, lead to
smaller population growth due to the unavailability of water to support such growth. Taking
an assumed population as a given and then finding ways to provide water to that population
overlooked an alternative that would provide less water for population growth leaving more
for other beneficial uses. CALFED apparently assumed that the California population would
grow as projected regardless of the availability of water and did not consider whether, if less
water was supplied, population growth would be affected accordingly, leading to less
demand.
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696,
774 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted), rev’d, 43 Cal. 4th 1143 (2008).
292
In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1168.
293
Id.
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later, lower-tier environmental review. 294
The CALFED PEIS/R included a general discussion of the potential
sources of water that the project would require. 295 The document did not
undertake, however, detailed environmental-impact analysis of diverting
water from each of the potential sources (e.g., “enlarging Shasta Lake,
expanding the Los Vaqueros reservoir, and constructing an in-Delta
storage facility”). 296 Rather, the PEIS/R stated that specific analyses of
the water sources would be included in second-tier environmental
reviews and were not appropriate at this stage of planning. 297 The court
of appeal found that deferring the identification and CEQA analysis of
specific sources of water violated CEQA, citing the Stanislaus Natural
Heritage Project decision. 298 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
“at the first-tier program stage, the environmental effects of obtaining
water from potential sources may be analyzed in general terms, without
the level of detail appropriate for second-tier, site-specific review. The
CALFED PEIS/R satisfies these requirements.” 299
CALFED is a multi-stage program that will be implemented over a
thirty-year period. 300 The specific sources of water to supply the project
have not yet been identified. 301 Distinguishing the facts at issue in
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho
Cordova, the court held that it was appropriate for CALFED to defer
detailed analysis of the environmental effects until CALFED has
identified the specific sources of water that will someday augment
existing exports from the CVP and SWP. 302 Because detailed
environmental review at the Phase II stage would be speculative and
inefficient, the CALFED agencies properly chose to defer site-specific
review of the potential water sources to second-tier environmental
documents. 303
Moving on to the final issue it addressed, the court noted that the

294

Id.
Id. at 1169.
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Id. at 1168 n.8.
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Id.
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Id. at 1171.
299
Id. at 1169; see also Rio Vista Farm Bureau Ctr. v. County of Solano 5 Cal. App. 4th 351
(Ct. App. 1992) (cited with approval in In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1171-72).
300
In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1172.
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Id. at 1172.
295

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol4/iss1/4

40

Moose: Water Supply and Land Use Planning
03_MOOSE PRINTER VERSION (FINAL)

2010]

10/11/2010 10:05:42 AM

WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE PLANNING

67

EWA is a part of CALFED’s ecosystem restoration strategy. 304 The
EWA allows the agencies to “acquire, bank, transfer and borrow water”
to protect fish habitat without reducing deliveries to water users. 305
CALFED identified the EWA as a second-tier project and thus discussed
its environmental effects only in general terms in the PEIS/R. 306 The
EWA was discussed in greater detail in a document entitled “California’s
Water Future: A Framework for Action” (“Action Framework”). 307 The
Action Framework was released before the certification of the PEIS/R. 308
The court of appeal held that, because the PEIS/R did not discuss the
EWA in what it considered to be sufficient detail, the document failed to
comply with CEQA. 309
The Supreme Court disagreed and found that the PEIS/R had
adequately addressed the EWA by discussing its effects in general terms
and deferring a more detailed analysis to a second-tier CEQA
document. 310 The EWA is a statewide program that will eventually
require various water-acquisition projects that, as of the year 2000, had
not yet been identified. Thus, until specific water-acquisition projects
were identified, the general discussion of the EWA in the PEIS/R was
sufficient to satisfy CEQA. 311 Furthermore, the court held, the specific
details discussed in the Action Framework were not required in a firsttier CEQA analysis. 312 As the court explained, “[t]he PEIS/R fulfills the
function of a first tier document because it analyzes the environmental
impacts of the mechanisms that will establish and develop the EWA –
water transfers (including purchases from willing sellers), reservoirs,
groundwater storage, and more flexible operations of water projects.” 313
In summary, the court upheld the PEIS/R against three broad-based
attacks, in each instance emphasizing the programmatic character of the
document and the fact that, under applicable legal standards, the kind of
detailed analysis demanded by the various petitioners was simply not
necessary in order to meet applicable CEQA standards.
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III. CONCLUSION
As California’s population has continued to grow, creating an evergreater demand for development, the Legislature and courts have
struggled with addressing the nexus between water supply and land use
planning. This effort has been no simple feat and has occurred against
the backdrop of ever-increasing uncertainties about the reliability of
water supplies in the state.
Nevertheless, after over two decades of appellate decisions dealing
with EIR challenges for substantial development projects, the California
Supreme Court weighed in, announcing a set of legal principles and
requirements that local agencies should follow in addressing water
supply issues within EIRs for such projects. Although the Vineyard Area
Citizens for Responsible Growth decision helped to clarify principles
previously found only within a sometimes confusing array of court of
appeal decisions, the rules announced by the Supreme Court are easier to
articulate than to satisfy in practice. Without doubt, the water-related
challenges facing California after the first decade of the twenty-first
century will likely continue to tax the creativity and intelligence of the
environmental consultants and planners charged with preparing EIRs, of
agency decisionmakers faced with demands for new development, and of
members of the public. The coming years will see a reduction in water
resources, due to a reduced snowpack resulting from climate change, as
well as the continuing deterioration of aquatic ecosystems attributable to
past societal failures to sufficiently account for environmental concerns
in the design of major water storage and delivery systems. Water issues
will only grow more complex as water resources become less plentiful.
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